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Arkansas. The case of Scobey v. Southern Lumber Co.' held that
constant irritation of a lung cancer by inhalations of emery and
wood dusts was an accidental aggravation and that the employer
was liable to the deceased employee's estate under the workmen's
compensation act. The court in effect said that working atmosphere,
dust and poor ventilation combined to make an accidental injury.
Epithelimatous cancer, the cause of the employee's death, is listed
in the compensation statute as an occupational disease.' The court,
however, looked not only to the listing of occupational diseases but
also to the listed causes of the occupational diseases. Since emery
dust was not listed as a cause of lung cancer, the court said this lung
cancer was not an occupational disease within the meaning of the
statute. The medical testimony was conflicting as to whether or not
breathing emery dust was the cause of the disease, but medical testi-
mony was in agreement as to the possibility that emery dust might
aggravate the condition. The court held the aggravation accidental
on the ground that in doubtful cases the question of sufficiency of
evidence should be resolved in favor of the claimant. The court
pointed out that the aggravation need not be the sole proximate
cause of death but need only be substantially contributory to the
death of the employee.
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
Arkansas. Two cases with almost identicalfacts concerning the
disease of silicosis resulted in different holdings. The case of Peer-
less Coal Co. v. Jones8 allowed recovery, while Collier Dunlap Coal
Co. v. Dickerson4 did not. About the only distinguishing fact was
that in the former case the employee worked eight years for his last
employer and in the latter case the employee worked two years for
I_ Ark .... ,238 S. W. 2d 640 (1951).
2 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 81-1314.8  Ark.. 240 S. W. 2d 647 (1951).
4 Ark. 239 S. W. 2d 9 (1951).
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his last employer. The evidence offered by both claimants amounted
to statements that each had been a miner for thirty years and that
their respective mines were dusty. In the case allowing recovery,
medical testimony indicated the silicosis of the claimant had been
acquired in a silica-hazardous industry, and the majority of the
court said that this was evidence that claimant had acquired the
disease in the mine of his last employer. In the case denying re-
covery the court said there was no evidence of silica in the last
employer's mine nor evidence of claimant being exposed to the
hazard of silicosis. It would seem that the medical testimony which
was accepted as evidence in the first case of exposure to silica
hazard spelled the difference between the two cases. The doctor's
testimony established that Jones was in a silica-hazardous industry,
that he had been employed as a miner for his last employer for
eight years and that the time period satisfied the Arkansas statute
connecting occupation with the disease of silicosis.5 It would seem
that injustice was done in the Dickerson case, since there was only
a medical opinion spelling the difference between recovery and no
recovery. However, since both appeals were on the sufficiency of
evidence to support an award by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission, both cases are correct according to the rules of review
in Arkansas. The supreme court, being limited to the record, could
only grant compensation where there was evidence to support such
a grant, and in the Dickerson case there was no evidence that the
last employer's mine was silica-hazardous. The court had no alter-
native but to deny recovery.
DEPENDENCY
Louisiana. The case of Patin v. T. L. James & Co.6 presented an
interesting question as to death benefits when deceased left a
partially dependent mother and a totally dependent non-relative.
The non-relative was the deceased's concubine's minor nephew.
5 ARx. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 81-1314 (h) (2).
6 ___ La. , 51 So. 2d 586 (1951).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Evidence established that the minor non-relative was totally de-
pendent and living with the deceased at the time of the latter's
death. Defendants contended that since an award was made to the
mother, an award to the minor was precluded. Defendant relied on
statutory provisions which seemed to state that a dependent other
than those named could recover only in absence of widow, widower,
child or dependent parent.' The court allowed the minor to recover
as a total dependent, saying that the list in the statute applied where
persons are wholly dependent. Since the mother was only a partial
deDendent. her recovery did not preclude the minor's recovery. The
court arrived at this conclusion by construing the section relied on
by the defendants in the light of other statutory provisions on de-
pendency.' These other provisions omitted the parents from a listing
of presumed total dependents and stated that where there are no
total dependents, benefits should be shared among partial depend-
ents according to the extent of their actual dependency.
EXTRATERRITORIAL COVERAGE
Louisiana. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Ohihausen v. Stern-
berg Dredging Co.9 held that if an employee and employer enter
into a contract of employment within the state, the Louisiana com-
pensation statute will be given extraterritorial effect to cover in-
juries received in another state or in a foreign country. In this case
the employee, a Louisiana resident, telephoned his former em-
ployer for a job and was directed by the employer to board a train
within the state and proceed to a new job in Florida. Later, the
employee was injured in Arkansas. The court found that since the
employment contract was made in Louisiana, extraterritorial cover-
age should be given to the Louisiana statute. It is interesting to note
here that Louisiana, not having an express extraterritorial pro-
vision, predicates the extraterritorial coverage on the fact that the
contract of employment was made within the boundaries of the state.
723 LA. Rav. STAT. (West, 1951) § 1232.
8 23 LA. REV. STAT. (West, 1951) §§ 1231, 1251-1253.
°218 La. 677, 50 So. 2d 803 (1951).
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Texas. On the other hand, Texas does have an express extraterri-
torial provision within its compensation statute.10 The provision
says, in effect, that an employee "hired in this State" has the right
to compensation for injuries received outside the state within one
year after leaving the state, provided he has not elected to recover
under the compensation statute of the state where the injuries occur-
red. The expression, "status of a Texas employee," has been used by
the Texas courts to determine whether extraterritorial coverage will
be given. This expression includes not only the element of a Texas
contract of employment but also the element or requirement that the
employee must have in fact done some work in Texas. It seems that
Louisiana emphasizes the place where the contract was made while
Texas gives weight to both place of contract and place of perform-
ance of work. For example, the case of Hale v. Texas Employers
Ins. Assn." held that a nine- or ten-week layoff between the time
that an employee worked for an employer in Texas and the time that
he worked for the employer in another state did not deprive him
of the "status of a Texas employee" necessary for coverage by the
Texas compensation statute for injuries received outside the terri-
torial limits of Texas. The court said that the layoff did not sever
the employee-employer relationship and emphasized that the period
of layoff was not unreasonable, considering the readiness of the
employee to respond to the employer's call and his intention to
resume work for the employer. It is apparent that the court con-
sidered that the employee should establish that he had done some
work in Texas on the Texas contract of employment in order that
he would qualify as having the "status of a Texas employee."
COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Texas. In Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Brannon"2 the Texas
Supreme Court handed down a decision holding that once the In-
dustrial Accident Board has approved a compromise settlement, the
10 TEx. REV. COv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8306, § 19.
-1 ----- Tex _. ,239 S. W. 2d 608 (1951).
12 . Tex ------ 242 S. W. 2d 185 (1951).
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settlement is final and can only be set aside judicially on the ground
of fraud or some other equity. The case is of interest because it is
a supreme court ruling approving the Board's practice of treating
the settlement as final and not subject to execution of a receipt by
the claimant. Prior to 1944 no order or approval was made by the
Board until payment was made and a receipt executed by the
claimant. Since 1944 the practice has been consistent with the hold-
ing in this case, i.e., to treat the Board's approval of a compromise
as final. It may be said that the old practice gave the claimant more
time to consider the advantages and disadvantages of the settlement,
but the new practice and the policy behind it have the advantage of
doing away with much delay and confusion, and it does guarantee
to the claimant that the insurer will within the time specified in the
Board's notice of approval carry out the terms of the compromise
settlement.
Michael 1. McNicholas.
